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Abstract
In an earlier paper, I criticized Schumpeter’s account of the obsolescence of
the entrepreneur in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. That account rests, I
argued, on a confusion about the nature of scientific knowledge and its role in the
competences of the firm. This paper is an attempt to take up the argument again,
moving it away from the doctrine-historical into the provinces of the economics
of organization. Drawing on the work of Max Weber, as well as on a case study
of the Swiss watch industry, the paper argues for the ineradicable role of personal
capitalism, properly understood.

Introduction.
What kind of capitalism creates rapid and sustained economic growth? One
perspective on this question, going back at least to Adam Smith, has focused on
those background institutions of civil society that are able to channel the rentseeking proclivities of individuals into the production of new wealth rather than
into the redistribution of existing wealth. Somewhat more recently, however, a
perspective has arisen that stresses the role in economic growth not of abstract
institutional structures but of the concrete institutions of business organization,
notably the modern business firm. Preeminent among living proponents of this
latter view is Alfred Chandler (1977, 1990), who retells the story of recent
(nineteenth- and twentieth-century) economic growth in the now-developed
countries as a history of the rise of managerial capitalism. In at least some
understandings of Chandler, this managerial capitalism, in which trained
professional managers run large multidivisional organizations, is to be
contrasted with the more backward structures of “personal” capitalism, in which
firms are controlled by individual owner-managers.
Before there was Chandler, of course, there was Schumpeter, whose work is a
source not only of an important view similar to that of Chandler but also —
perhaps astonishingly — of the opposite view, namely that the source of
economic growth is indeed to be found in the behavior of individuals — of
entrepreneurs — who create new wealth, often at the expense of old wealth,
within the constraints of a particular kind of civil society. In an earlier paper
(Langlois 1987), I presented an argument (not yet well absorbed by members of
the Schumpeter Society1 let alone by the profession at large) that, contrary to the
1

On the first page of his interesting new book, our esteemed President Gunnar Eliasson
(1996) tells us that, in “his dismal (1942) analysis of the capacity of large firms to
routinize innovative behavior,” Schumpeter gave up his “Austrian” account “of the
innovator and the unpredictable entrepreneur.” In fairness, Eliasson associates the
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conventional wisdom, these two visions of capitalism and economic growth do
not track the difference between an earlier (or “Mark I”) and a later (or “Mark
II”) Schumpeter; rather, these two views coexist in a way that is remarkably
consistent over time in Schumpeter’s work.

Like Chandler (McCraw 1988),

Schumpeter was heavily influenced by Max Weber’s theory of bureaucracy and
social progress (Csontos 1991). In both his early (1934) and his later (1950) work,
Schumpeter consistently espoused the view that “progressive rationalization” in
Weber’s sense would make innovation a matter of routine, thus rendering
obsolete the personal capitalism of the entrepreneur and bringing to dominance
in economic growth the role of the large bureaucratic organization.
In that earlier paper, I criticized Schumpeter’s account of the obsolescence
of the entrepreneur on the grounds that it reflects an illegitimate shift of
underlying epistemology or, to put it another way, that it rests on a confusion
about the nature of scientific knowledge and its role in what we would
nowadays call the competences of the firm. In this paper I take up this argument
again, moving it away from the realm of the doctrine-historical and the
epistemological into the provinces of the economics of organization. Using a
detailed historical account of the Swiss watch industry as a focusing device, I
will suggest that the notion of personal capitalism is a far more subtle and
complex one than its detractors have recognized. Moreover, far from being a
primitive holdover from pre-corporate times, personal capitalism — properly
understood — is in fact an important engine of economic change and growth.

“Austrian” Schumpeter with the 1911 first German edition of the Theory of Economic
Development, and the obsolescence thesis did not appear in its full form until the second
German edition (Csontos 1991). Nonetheless, I resist the idea that Schumpeter “gave
up” anything in his 1942 book that he hadn’t given up essentially from the very
beginning.
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Schumpeter and Weber.
The broad outlines of Schumpeter’s theory of entrepreneurship are of Weberian
provenance.2 Indeed, one might say that Schumpeter’s schema is an application
of Weber’s social theory to the problem of economic growth.

Schumpeter’s

innovation is to associate Weber’s category of charismatic leadership with the
concept of entrepreneurship.
As it is for Weber, capitalist development is for Schumpeter a march from
traditional behavior to rational behavior. In “the circular flow of economic life,”
Schumpeter’s version of equilibrium in early capitalism, behavior is rational
only within the bounds of traditional or habitual behavior.
The assumption that conduct is prompt and rational is in all
cases a fiction. But it proves to be sufficiently near to reality, if
things have time to hammer logic into men. Where this has
happened, and within the limits in which it has happened, one
may rest content with this fiction and build theories upon it. It
is then not true that habit or custom or non-economic ways of
thinking cause a hopeless difference between the individuals of
different classes, times, or cultures, and that, for example, the
“economics of the stock exchange” would be inapplicable say to
the peasants of to-day or the craftsmen of the Middle Ages. On
the contrary the same theoretical picture in its broadest contour
lines fits the individuals of quite different cultures, whatever
their degree of intelligence and of economic rationality, and we

2

The influence of Weber is explicit in the second German edition, but the references were
largely expunged from the English translation, probably because Schumpeter saw
methodological fashions, and his intended audience, as having changed in the interim
(Csontos 1991).
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can depend upon it that the peasant sells his calf as cunningly
and egotistically as the stock exchange member his portfolio of
shares.

But this holds good only where precedents without

number

have

formed

conduct

through

decades

and,

in

fundamentals, through hundreds of thousands of years, and
have eliminated unadapted behavior (Schumpeter 1934, p. 80).
This picture of economic behavior as guided by routines — indeed, by routines
that seem to be the result of some kind of selection process — is the inspiration
for much of the association of Schumpeter with modern evolutionary economics
(Nelson and Winter 1982), an association that, pace Hodgson (1993), is not at all
unwarranted despite Schumpeter’s negative remarks about evolutionary biology
(Langlois and Everett 1994).
Economic growth can take place only when the circular flow is upset,
which requires the entrepreneur. Since — in early capitalism, at least — rational
action can occur only within the bounds of evolved habit, the behavior of the
entrepreneur must be non- or extra-rational; it must be a matter of intuition.
What has been done already has the sharp-edged reality of all
things which we have seen and experienced; the new is only the
figment of our imagination. Carrying out a new plan and acting
according to a customary one are things as different as making a
road and walking along it.
How different a thing this is becomes clearer if one bears
in mind the impossibility of surveying exhaustively all the
effects and counter-effects of the projected enterprise. Even as
many of them as could in theory be ascertained if one had
R. N. Langlois
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unlimited time and means must practically remain in the dark.
As military action must be taken in a given strategic position
even if all the data potentially procurable are not available, so
also in economic life action must be taken without working out
all the details of what must be done.

Here the success of

everything depends on intuition, the capacity of seeing things in
a way which afterwards proves to be true, even though it cannot
be established at the moment, and of grasping the essential fact,
discarding the unessential, even though one can give no account
of the principles by which this is done. Thorough preparatory
work,

and

special

knowledge,

breadth

of

intellectual

understanding, talent for logical analysis, may under certain
circumstances be sources of failure. (Schumpeter 1934, p. 85.)
I will return to the cognitive implications of this view presently.

For the

moment, however, the important point is that entrepreneurial action is an
instance of charismatic leadership, which, for Weber as for Schumpeter, is
central to the theory of social change (Parsons 1949, p. 663).
Weber is principally concerned with the religious leader or prophet, and
to a lesser extent with military and political leadership; Schumpeter borrows
heavily from that analysis in his characterization of the entrepreneur. Here we
begin to see the outlines of Schumpeterian “personal capitalism,” which in its
pure form is the antithesis of bureaucratic organization.

Consider Weber’s

account of the organization of charisma.
The corporate group which is subject to charismatic authority is
based on an emotional form of communal relationship.
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administrative staff of the charismatic leader does not consist of
“officials”; at least its members are not technically trained.

...

There is no hierarchy; the leader merely intervenes in general or in
individual cases when he considers the members of his staff
inadequate to a task to which they have been entrusted. There is
no such thing as a definite sphere of authority and of competence.
... There are no established administrative organs. ... There is no
system of formal rules, of abstract legal principles, and hence no
process of judicial decision oriented to them. But equally there is
no legal wisdom oriented to judicial precedent. Formally concrete
judgments are newly created from case to case and are originally
regarded as divine judgments and revelations.

... The genuine

prophet, like the genuine military leader and every true leader in
this sense, preaches, creates, or demands new obligations. In the
pure type of charisma, these are imposed on the authority of
revolution [sic] by oracles, or of the leader’s own will, and are
recognized by the members of the religious, military, or party
group because they come from such a source. (Weber 1947, pp. 360361.)
But the charismatic organization is perhaps best understood in contrast to what
it is not.
Charismatic authority is thus outside the realm of everyday
routine and the profane sphere.

In this respect it is sharply

opposed both to rational, and particularly bureaucratic, authority,
and to traditional authority, whether in its patriarchal, patrimonial,
or any other form.
R. N. Langlois
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specifically forms of everyday routine control of action; while the
charismatic type is the direct antithesis of this.

Bureaucratic

authority is specifically rational in the sense of being bound to
intellectually analysable rules; while charismatic authority is
specifically irrational in the sense of being foreign to all rules.
Traditional authority is bound to the precedents handed down
from the past and to this extent is also oriented to rules. Within the
sphere of its claims, charismatic authority repudiates the past, and
is in this sense a specifically revolutionary force. (Weber 1947, pp.
361-362.)
It is the charismatic, and therefore revolutionary, quality of entrepreneurship
that makes it a source of economic growth, that allows it to play the role of
“industrial mutation — if I may use that biological term — that incessantly
revolutionizes the industrial structure from within, incessantly destroying the old
one, incessantly creating a new one” (Schumpeter 1950, p. 83, emphasis original).
Recast in these explicitly Weberian terms, Schumpeter’s theory of
entrepreneurship looks something like this.

In its undeveloped state, an

economy is based largely on traditional behavior, which bounds the possibilities
for conscious economic activity.

Under the right institutional setting —

bourgeois capitalism — charismatic leadership arises, in the form of the
entrepreneur, to break the crust of convention and to create new wealth by
“‘lead[ing]’ the means of production into new channels” (Schumpeter 1934, p.
89).

Charisma is personal and revolutionary; “in its pure form charismatic

authority may be said to exist only in the process of originating. It cannot
remain stable, but becomes either traditionalized or rationalized, or a
combination of both” (Weber 1947, p. 364). In the economic sphere, of course,
R. N. Langlois
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the tendency is toward rationalization. Not only do imitators rush in once the
entrepreneur has blazed the trail, but also the problem of succession within the
entrepreneurial organization leads (if the organization is to continue) to
bureaucratization, that is, to the substitution of rules for personal authority; to
the creation of abstract offices divorced from their individual holders; and to the
increasing preeminence of specialized knowledge and spheres of competence
(Weber 1947, pp. 330-334).

Progressive rationalization.
The transformation from the traditional to the rational takes place at two levels.
At the level of each entrepreneurial organization, charismatic authority, having
destroyed the traditional, must eventually give way to bureaucracy as the
problem of succession arises. It is here that we can locate Chandler’s notions of
personal and managerial capitalism.

What he finds wanting in personal

capitalism is precisely the extent of rationalization in the Weberian sense.
Compared with the foremost examples of managerial capitalism (e.g., in the
United States), the British, Chandler argues, failed adequately to extend
hierarchical control and to create management based on abstract rules and
spheres of competence.
In most British enterprises senior executives worked closely in the
same office building, located in or near the largest plant, having
almost daily personal contact with, and thus directly supervising,
middle and often lower-level managers. Such enterprises had no
need for the detailed organization charts and manuals that had
come into common use in large American and German firms before
1914. In these British companies, selection to senior positions and

R. N. Langlois
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to the board depended as much on personal ties as on managerial
competence. The founders and their heirs continued to have a
significant influence on top-level decision-making even after their
holdings in the enterprise were diminished. (Chandler 1990, p.
242.)
British personal capitalism thus represented a kind of half-way house between
the charismatic founders and full rationalization on the American model. I will
return to this strand of thought below.
At

another

level,

however,

resides

the

claim

that

progressive

rationalization affects the entire economic society, eventually displacing
traditionalism completely. The entrepreneur is both the agent and the victim of
this transformation. In uprooting the deeply planted traditional ways of life, the
entrepreneur prepares the field for rational authority.3 But — and this is the
heart of Schumpeter’s thesis — once the hard work of crust-breaking has been
done, charismatic leadership is no longer necessary, and the entrepreneur must
ride into the sunset.

The entrepreneurial role is then taken up by large

bureaucratic firms, organized along rational lines, who can engineer change
without need for charisma.

The final result of the process of progressive

rationalization, indeed, is a kind of bureaucratic socialism, since, without any
substantive function or source of legitimacy, entrepreneurial capitalism as a
system must ultimately follow the entrepreneur westward.

3

“A high degree of traditionalism in habits of life, such as characterized the labouring
classes in early modern times, has not sufficed to prevent a great increase in the
rationalization of economic enterprise under capitalist direction. ... Nevertheless, this
traditionalistic attitude had to be at least partly overcome in the Western world before
the further development of the specifically modern type of rational capitalist economy
could take place.” (Weber 1947, p. 167.)
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At first glance, Schumpeter’s brief in favor of large organizations seems
consistent with Weber, who praised the efficiency of rational bureaucracy in the
most lavish terms.4
Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic
type of administrative organization — that is, the monocratic
variety of bureaucracy — is, from a purely technical point of view,
capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this
sense formally the most rational known means of carrying out
imperative control over human beings. It is superior to any other
form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline,
and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high
degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization
and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in
intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations, and is
formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks.
(Weber 1947, p. 337.)
Notice, however, that this paean does not portray bureaucracy as innovative. It is
precise and reliable, but not necessarily dynamic. “Both rational and traditional
authority,” as we saw, “are specifically forms of everyday routine control of
action” (Weber 1947, p. 361). Bureaucracy is designed for “imperative control
over human beings,” that is, making people do what the boss wants, but not
necessarily for performing the multifold tasks of an entire economy. And it
produces results that are “calculable” because it reduces internal variance, not

4

Weber did not, however, see bureaucracy as generally good, and he worried about its
stultifying effect on humanity.
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necessarily because it (or rationalization more generally) extends the scope of
human ability to “calculate” or predict the future.
Indeed, one could argue that Schumpeter goes well beyond Weber — into
what, in my view, is illegitimate territory.

Recall that, for Schumpeter,

progressive rationalization seems to mean more than the Weberian idea of
demystification; it seems also to mean that the growth of scientific knowledge
will extend the bounds of rationality in the sense of Herbert Simon:

with

progressive rationalization, our “control of facts” becomes more perfect, and we
become able “quickly and reliably” to calculate what had previously required
intuition and a “flash of genius.” Schumpeter is thus making a claim about the
cognitive, not merely the command-and-control, possibilities of bureaucracy.
I doubt that we live in a wiser age; but I do think that we are perhaps
more accustomed today than in Schumpeter’s time to question the cognitionexpanding character of conscious, scientific knowledge.

The best and the

brightest have too often failed to live up to their billing. As F. A. Hayek (1948)
argued in the context of the socialist calculation debate, such stout claims for
conscious scientific knowledge (on which the possibility of socialist calculation
depends) are an insupportable hubris that ignores the large and ineradicable role
of rules, of routine, of tacit knowledge.

Rationality — or, more correctly,

cognitive ability — is perhaps even more bounded today, in the avalanche of
information that “progressive rationalization” has generated, than it was in more
traditional times.
Interestingly, it is far from clear that Weber would have been on
Schumpeter’s side in this matter. For one thing, Weber, as we saw, stressed the
static character of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is about imposing rules, not about
changing the rules. It is a way to marshal well-defined means in service of a
R. N. Langlois
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well-defined end; but, like the ideal type of traditional authority, rational
authority is not dynamic.

On the matter of bureaucracy replacing

entrepreneurial capitalism, we can note that Weber came down explicitly against
the possibility of socialist calculation, effectively endorsing the views of von
Mises.5

Schumpeterianism: Mark I and Mark II.
We learn the most from writers like Weber and Schumpeter not when we
approach them from the perspective of the antiquarian or of the adoring disciple
but when we treat them as capable of engaging our own research programs.
How, then, can we apply their ideas to the present-day discussion of capitalism,
organizational form, and economic growth?
Much of the modern literature has focused on the idea of organizational
capabilities, which provides a language large enough to encompass the ideas of
Weber and Schumpeter. Broadly speaking, organizational capabilities are what
organizations can do well; and Weber was arguably talking about organizational
capabilities when he described the efficiency of rational bureaucracy.
The term “capabilities” was first used by G. B. Richardson (1972, p. 888)
to refer to “the knowledge, experience, and skills” of the organization.

In

Richardson, however, the import of the concept was not to emphasize the extent
of organizational capabilities but rather to stress their limitations. Because of
what are effectively cognitive constraints, all organizations must specialize; and,
5

This was not an intellectually fashionable view in the 1930s and 1940s, when Weber’s
ideas began filtering into the English-speaking academic world. In a fit of early political
correctness, indeed, Talcott Parsons found it necessary to insert into his translation of
Weber a footnote apologizing for his author’s failure to hold views in accord with “the
principal weight of technical opinion” on the subject (Weber 1947, p. 194n). That weight
must not have been tied down very tightly, however, as it has lately shifted decidedly to
Weber’s side.

R. N. Langlois

Schumpeter and Personal Capitalism

Page 12

since the chain of production in an advanced economy requires a diversity of
very different capabilities, the costs of integrating across many links in that chain
are necessarily high, and firms must rely on various kinds of market
arrangements to coordinate their activities even in the face of the “contractual
hazards” emphasized in transaction-cost economics.
This point has also been made in a slightly different way by Nelson and
Winter (1982) and to some extent by the “dynamic capabilities” literature they
helped to inspire (Teece and Pisano 1994; Langlois and Robertson 1995). In
Nelson and Winter, economic action, even within large organizations, is a matter
of rule-following behavior. Agents possess repertoires of routines, which are
habitual patterns of behavior that consist in tacit, skill-like knowledge. These
agents are “boundedly rational” and do not consciously survey their
environments and choose a substantively rational course of action, except within
the bounds of what routine behavior has made possible.6 The parallels here with
Schumpeter’s account of traditional behavior in the circular flow should be
obvious. The crucial difference, however, is that Nelson and Winter see such
behavior not as limited to earlier society but as an inescapable implication of the
mechanics of human cognition. Agents in advanced capitalism also follow rules
and abide by habits. By implication, economic change in Nelson and Winter is a
non-rational or entrepreneurial activity: it is taking a leap into the unknown, not
a matter of conscious planning.
There are, however, some present-day writers who are inclined to take
the notion of organizational capabilities in a different direction and to extract
from it some very large claims for the efficacy of large organizations and for

6

To put it another way, substantive or “optimizing” rationality of the neoclassical sort is
itself a learned routine or set of routines.
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their superiority to individual action and to smaller, more personal enterprises.
For example, William Lazonick (1991), who likes his Schumpeter with a large
dollop of Marx, presents what is arguably a historicist account of the progressive
development of capitalism, which reaches its apex in “collective capitalism.”7 As
in Schumpeter’s account of later capitalism, large organizations in Lazonick’s
collective capitalism are not only effective at managing existing structures but
are also prime engines of innovation. And, as in Schumpeter, the basis for the
innovativeness and the wealth-creating character of large organizations resides
in their ability effectively to break cognitive boundaries and consciously to
reinvent the division of labor.
The more technologically complex the innovation, the greater the
need for innovative skills and the more extensive the specialized
division of labor required to develop and utilize these skills. The
organization must not only develop these specialized skills so that
they can contribute to the innovation, but also coordinate them so
that they constitute a collective productive power. Organizational
capability permits the enterprise to plan and coordinate the
development of these innovative skills, integrating them into an
enterprise-specific collective force. As far as the innovation process
is concerned, therefore, organizational capability permits the planned
coordination of the horizontal and vertical division of labor required
7

More recently, Lazonick has made clear that he includes in collective capitalism — or
“organizational integration,” as he now terms it — the activities of “individuals and
groups who are employed by legally distinct firms that pursue common goals”
(Lazonick and West 1995, p. 231). Taken seriously, however, this idea renders unhelpful
if not tautological the notion of “collective capitalism,” since it embraces activities that
economists have viewed, and ought rightly to view, as reflecting the capabilities of
markets (properly understood) rather than of firms, and thereby calls into question any
implications in the analysis for the advantages of large firms per se. On this point see
Loasby (1993) and Langlois (1994).
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to generate an innovation. (Lazonick 1991, p. 203, emphasis
altered.)
It is not clear what are the details of how this planning and coordination takes
place, but we are left with the strong impression that it is decidedly not the
handiwork of some charismatic central individual, or of the firm’s owners in any
sense, but is instead the product of professional managers.
At the risk of parody, let me denote these two visions of organizational
capabilities as “Schumpeterianism Mark I” and “Schumpeterianism Mark II.”
Which of these is closer to right? History may shed some light on the issue, even
if it may never be decisive. Consider, for example, a case with some clear
Weberian resonances: the development, over more than four centuries, of the
watchmaking industry in John Calvin’s Geneva and the nearby Jura mountains.8

From Friedrich Hayek to Nicolas Hayek.
Calvinism was in one sense responsible for the birth of the Swiss watch industry.
Noted jewelry-makers and goldsmiths in the Middle Ages, Genevans found it
necessary to apply their capabilities in new directions in the austere climate of
Calvinism. Fortunately, “the same puritanical regime that condemned jewelry
was willing to make an exception for watches: if Calvinists were not interested
in time and its measurement, who was?” (Landes 1983, p. 232).

The

reconversion was accomplished under the tutelage of immigrant Huguenots
who were fleeing persecution elsewhere in Europe.

8

This is a case that has attracted significant scholarly attention, which makes the facts
relatively easy to assemble. However, most of the best interpretive histories, notably
David Landes’s brilliant Revolution in Time (1983), stop before certain recent events that
will be of considerable interest to the theme of this paper.
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In the sixteenth century, watch making was a skilled craft carried out in
individual workshops. Despite the medieval ideal of the “compleat” craftsman,
there was in fact considerable division of labor within the workshop, with
various apprentices and journeymen carrying on relatively specialized activities
under the supervision of the master (Landes 1983, pp. 206-7).

The watch

industry was already well established by the time Geneva, a most bourgeois and
therefore mercantilist city, got around to forming a guild in 1601. Apart from
normal restrictions on entry, the Genevan fabrique also sought to keep out
immigrants and even their native-born children.

In the face of success and

growing demand, these restrictions generated an unintended incentive for
evasion along with the intended economic rents. The result was the birth of the
établissage system, in which a master watchmaker put out component fabrication
to non-guild (and therefore cheaper) subcontractors outside the city gates. Soon
the more routine tasks — like the production of the ébauche, the basic watch
movement lacking finish and adjustment — were sent “offshore” to nearby
France and Savoy, with the fine assembly reserved for Geneva (Landes 1983, p.
240-243).
The division of labor under établissage thus proceeded within a trajectory
of vertical fragmentation and of heavy reliance on arms’-length coordination.
Already by 1660 some craftsmen had begun specializing in the production of
springs (Jequier 1991, p. 324), and by the end of the eighteenth century the
industry could boast some thirty specialized trades (Enright 1995, p. 128). As
Adam Smith would have predicted, the system of fabrication en parties brisées —
separate-parts manufacture — was particularly conducive to the invention of
specialized tools9 (Jequier 1991, loc. cit.).
9

In fact, Smith did comment very briefly on watchmaking, in the context of the effect on
real prices of the productivity improvements that arise in “consequence of better
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This pattern was reinforced when, in the late eighteenth century, the
industry took its next leap, from Geneva to the Jura. Following the lead of one
Frédéric Japy, who had learned to mass-produce relatively uniform ébauches in
nearby France, the Jura began producing watches using techniques of
standardization and mechanization. Like the Genevans, the Jurassians relied on
specialized tools. “But the Jura makers went their predecessors one better. They
bought their tools and improved them; invented their own; and went on from
individual tool making (each watchmaker his own) to production by specialist
toolmakers for general sale. In so doing, they created for the first time on the
continent an equipment branch to match that of Lancashire and generate new
devices and techniques” (Landes 1983, p. 261). In short, the Jura had blossomed
into a true Marshallian industrial district.
With its center of gravity displaced to the countryside, the Swiss industry
bettered the already significant success and reputation that Geneva had earned.
By 1790, the Jura had produced some fifty thousand units, a figure that would
double by 1817 (Enright 1995, p. 129).

The source of this dynamism was

arguably the industry’s structure. “That was really one of the great strengths of
the Swiss industry: it was really a congeries of subbranches, of local fabriques
specializing in watches of one or another variety or in one or another stage of
manufacture. Whatever you wanted, someone somewhere could make. No run
was too small, no order too special. As a result, the industry was able to cater to
all markets, to experiment with novelty, to copy and exploit the inventions of
others” (Landes 1983, p. 267).
machinery, of greater dexterity, and of a more proper division and distribution of work”
(Smith 1976, I.xi.o.1, p. 260). Real price reductions, Smith says, have been “most
remarkable” in industries using the “coarser metals” as materials. “A better movement
of a watch, than about the middle of the last century could have been bought for twenty
pounds, may now perhaps be had for twenty shillings” (Smith 1976, I.ix.o.4, loc. cit.).
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Like the other great Marshallian districts of history, including Lancashire
and Silicon Valley, the Swiss watch industry relied on those benefits of
decentralization praised by F. A. Hayek (1948).

Its diversity permitted the

effective use of a far greater amount of dispersed and tacit knowledge than
could be contained within the boundaries of even a large organization; and its
porousness permitted experiment, adaptation, and innovation. To most minds,
moreover, the Swiss watch industry in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
would represent a classic example of economic progress along the lines of
Schumpeterian “early” capitalism. There was certainly plenty of (individual)
entrepreneurship, which creatively destroyed older structures (as in the rise of
the Jura over Geneva), although without, however, altering the fundamental
paradigm of industry evolution. The extent to which the early history of this
industry best fits Schumpeter’s account of the entrepreneur is a matter to which I
will return. Notice here that, although not at all “rationalized” in the sense of
Schumpeter or Chandler — that is, organized along the lines of large, vertically
integrated firms — the Swiss watchmakers of this era were certainly already
rationalized in Weber’s sense.

They were definitely oriented toward the

mundane and toward rational ends. As a group, they were hardly tradition
bound, welcoming new ideas so long as they promised a profit.
To the extent that traditionalism played a role in the industry, it was
traditionalism in the sense of Nelson and Winter not of Weber, that is, the
traditionalism of habit and routine oriented toward a particular pattern of
productive skill. As is clear in Jequier’s (1991, pp. 324-5) account of one typical
firm, that of the Le Coultre family, successive generations were often forced to
fight the conservatism of their fathers in introducing new methods and
technology, sometime to the point of open secession.
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system, old techniques could disappear and new ones replace them without
fundamentally changing the structure of the industry.

In the language of

Tushman and Anderson (1986), innovation, including mechanization, was
competence enhancing for the district as a whole, and usually even for the
family firms it comprised. As Jequier (1991, p. 325) tells us, up until the mid
nineteenth century, the “division of labor and the introduction of the first
machines, operated by the worker’s hand or foot, constituted no threat to the
work communities of the Jura.”10
The transition from hand-operated machines to machine tools to
automatic machines, which necessitated the separation of the workshop from the
home and eventually the erection of factories, was somewhat more disruptive
(Jequier 1991, p. 326); but it the end the changes were absorbed with
considerable success.

In part, the transformation was propelled by external

competitive forces, notably the rise of American firms employing the so-called
American system of mass production and wielding innovations in marketing.
At the same time, however, mechanization already lay along the trajectory the
Swiss were following; and the Marshallian character of their industry allowed
them in the end to outdo the Americans on their own ground.
The story of the American challenge in watchmaking introduces some
bright Chandlerian threads into the tapestry. For the rise of American watch
industry followed the pattern of many others discussed in The Visible Hand,
albeit on a somewhat smaller scale. Lacking the pools of skilled workers and the
10

By contrast, artisans in Geneva were more organized, and the Association of Watchcase
Workers, founded in 1842, stood in the way of changes in the division of labor. But the
result was the establishment of separate factories using the new machines. “Here,” says
Jequier (1991, p. 325), “we may note another characteristic of Swiss watchmaking: the
appearance of new manufacturing processes did not eliminate old practices, and usually
the two systems operated side by side, which explains the extraordinary heterogeneity
of this sector, first as a craft and then as an industry.”
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webs of existing organization available in many European industries (like Swiss
watchmaking), America had to create new capabilities administratively within
vertically and laterally integrated organizations. Moreover, because of the lack
of existing skills, American firms substituted physical for human capital or, to
put it more instructively, shifted the locus of skill on the margin away from the
workers and into the machines and the organization of production. This indeed
is the task that the American system was intended to accomplish: to reduce the
need

for

skilled

adjustment

by

making

the

parts

(relatively

more)

interchangeable and by using “skilled” machines that could turn out these morestandardized parts in large numbers (Hounshell 1984). We now know that these
parts were far less interchangeable than advertised (Clarke 1985; Hoke 1989).
But the approach placed American firms on a technological trajectory that
spurred mechanization and produced a high rate of productivity improvement.
American firms were thus able eventually to overtake and surpass competitors
(like the British in some industries) who were not on such a trajectory. As we
will see, however, this approach worked less well on the Swiss.
The principal exemplar of the American system in watchmaking was the
Waltham Watch Company. In production, the firm moved beyond the relatively
versatile machine tools then in use in the industry toward more special-purpose,
high-volume devices. This often required Waltham to invent its own machines,
as outside tool makers were hard-pressed to meet the tolerances necessary
(Landes 1983, p. 315). The results were phenomenal. By 1877, Waltham was
producing some 600,000 watches per year, with a cumulative output on the
order of 10 million. Moreover, quality equaled or surpassed that of Switzerland,
as Swiss representatives discovered to their great shock at the 1876 centennial
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exhibition in Philadelphia, where American watches and watchmaking were on
display (Landes 1983, p. 319; Jequier 1991, p. 326).
Waltham operated with a highly integrated structure that contrasted
sharply with the Swiss industry. In one reading, this is rationalization à la
Chandler (if not necessarily à la Weber) into large, formally articulated
organizations. In this reading, Waltham, like so many other American firms in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, succeeded because it
represented an organizational structure inherently superior to the market it had
replaced.

In another reading, however, Waltham’s structure reflected the

inadequacies of existing American capabilities rather than the inherent
superiority of its form.

Because of the need systemically to reinvent the

production process, and because of the lack of a ready web of outside suppliers,
the Americans were forced to rely on integration as the best of actually available
alternatives.11
In the specific case of watchmaking, the fragmented Swiss industry
responded quickly to the American threat.

“In spite of some inevitable

resistance,” Jequier (1991, p. 326) tells us, “the spirit of enterprise asserted itself”;
and assemblers began building new factories and introducing the same kind of
machinery as the Americans. In 1870, three-quarters of the 35,000 employed in
Swiss watchmaking worked at home; by 1905, only a quarter of the more than
50,000 workers did so (Jequier 1991, loc. cit.). Nonetheless, when Switzerland
regained the technological and market lead toward the end of the nineteenth
century, it remained far less vertically integrated than the American industry;
relied far more on outwork; and comprised thousands of firms to the dozen or so
in America (Landes 1983, p, 323).
11

Meanwhile, Waltham’s highly integrated

For an elaboration of this idea, see Langlois and Robertson (1995), especially chapter 3.
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structure proved far less conducive to the routine administration of its operation
than it had to bringing that operation into being, and the firm virtually collapsed
under principal-agent problems (Landes 1983, pp. 329-334). Even its better-run
competitors lost ground to the Swiss.

Indeed, both Waltham and Elgin,

Waltham’s long-time domestic rival, are now Swiss owned.
By 1910, the Swiss industry dominated the world.
The Swiss controlled the micromechanical export industry by cost
competitiveness, superior manufacturing competency, high levels
of precision, and extraordinary attention to details and style. The
vertically integrated parts manufacturers achieved economies of
scale through volume production. This benefit was passed on to
assemblers in the form of low-cost movements. In the most laborintensive aspects of the industry, the vertically disintegrated
system of assembly and case manufacture kept overhead charges
low (Glasmeier 1991, p. 471).
This happy situation was not, however, to last long. In the years after World
War I, incomes declined, protectionist barriers went up, and the large Russian
market disappeared; as a result, demand for Swiss watches fell sharply
(Glasmeier, loc. cit.; Landes 1983, pp. 326-7). Like many other industries around
the world, the Swiss watchmakers responded with cartelization, in an attempt to
stabilize revenues and — importantly in this case — to halt the practice of
chablonnage, the exportation of components to countries trying to create their own
watch industries behind protectionist walls.

The assemblers created the

Fédération Horlogère in 1924 to safeguard their interests; the 17 makers of
ébauches combined into the trust Ebauches, S. A. in 1926; and the component
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makers grouped into the Union des branches annexes de l’horlogerie (UBAH) in
the same year. By 1928, these associations had crafted cartel arrangements to set
production, pricing, and export policies, especially, in the last case, with respect
to chablonnage (Landes 1983, p. 327; Enright 1995, p. 130).
As is normally the case with private cartels, however, these arrangements
proved unstable, especially once the Depression hit. The government of the
confederation was called in, and, with the help of the banking industry, formed
a huge holding company, called ASUAG after the acronym of its German name.
The company bought up the majority of shares in Ebauches, S. A. along with a
number of component makers (Landes 1983, p. 328; Glasmeier 1991, p. 472;
Enright 1995, p. 130). The trust immediately put a halt to chablonnage. In 1934,
the government obliged further with a statute that put the finishing touches on a
cartel that Landes (1983, p. 328) rates as one of the strongest in history. In
addition to setting up detailed regulation of output, the statute essentially
forbade component import and export, and even prohibited the export of
watchmaking machinery. Moreover, ASUAG got in the habit of buying up and
subsidizing failing component makers.
By the late thirties, the industry was in recovery. But, as even cartels
cannot create rents where none are to be had, this resurgence surely had less to
do with cartelization than with the requickening of watch demand upon the end
of the Depression and the arrival of the Second World War, during which the
neutral Swiss were able to supply both sides. After the war, Switzerland found
itself in a position very like that of the United States: standing almost alone as an
unscathed competitor amid the devastation of war.

And, like the U. S.,

Switzerland lived well on the resulting rents until the reemergence of German
and (especially) Japanese industries by the early 70s.
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America had one threat to offer in the post-war years. In the ‘forties, a
Norwegian immigrant named Lehmkuhl had taken over the near-defunct
Waterbury Clock Company with an eye to making fuses for the war effort. At
war’s end, he refitted the company to make cheap mechanical watches on an
updated American system, using newly developed metals in production and
following a mass-marketing plan that bypassed the jeweler’s shop for the fiveand-dime (Landes 1983, p. 339). Timex — as the brand was called — swept the
American market and made inroads in Europe.

But this was the sort of

challenge the Swiss had seen before; and, despite their sluggish cartel structure,
it was one to which they could eventually respond.12 The real challenge to the
industry in the late ‘sixties and early ‘seventies came from a much less familiar
source: electronics.
A watch, even a mechanical one, is basically an oscillator: it divides time
into pulses in order to calibrate the movement of the hands. By mid century,
solid-state electronics was beginning to make possible a different kind of
oscillator, one based on piezoelectric crystals that can be made to vibrate
precisely and dependably under alternating current.

By the late 1960s,

microelectronics had proceeded to a point at which the vibration of a crystal (like
quartz) could be used to calibrate microcontroller circuitry driving tiny electric
stepping motors. Indeed, it became possible to hook the circuits to light-emitting
diodes and then liquid-crystal displays, thus eliminating mechanical parts
entirely. The quartz watch was born. This change, which took the better part of
a decade to work itself out, proved far more competence destroying for the
Swiss industry than anything that had come before.
12

Although the Swiss

In fact, however, the Swiss never really needed to respond. Although market share fell
from a post-war high of 80 per cent to 40 per cent in 1970, total demand was growing
fast enough to keep capacity utilization and profits high (Enright 1995, p. 133).
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retained many capabilities relevant to analog quartz watches, the mechanical
ébauche, a core Swiss competence, had been replaced by crystal, circuit, and
motor.
The inability of the Swiss watch industry to respond to the electronic
challenge represents a clear instance of industrial inertia.13 The Swiss industry
was a well-tuned system of capabilities for producing precise and reliable
mechanical watches in all price ranges.

But it is the inevitable corollary of

having capabilities well adapted for one purpose that those capabilities are not
well adapted to other purposes. As a result, as Schumpeter remarks, “new
combinations are, as a rule, embodied, as it were, in new firms which generally
do not arise out of the old ones but start producing beside them; ... in general it
is not the owner of stage-coaches who builds railways” (Schumpeter 1934, p. 66).
In this case, it was firms — in America and, especially, Japan — with relevant
capabilities in electronics and electromechanical assembly that took up the
banner of quartz. Initially, at least, the Swiss played down the threat, which,
like most such threats, was far clearer in retrospect than in prospect. When the
pressure began to mount, the Swiss industry responded with a burst of
improvement in the productivity of mechanical watchmaking. “That,” notes
Landes, “is a universal characteristic of once-dominant technologies: they make
some of their greatest improvements under sentence of obsolescence; the finest
days of the sailing ship came after the advent of steam” (Landes 1983, p. 351).
But these improvements were too little too late. With quartz technology, firms
like Citizen and Seiko could make watches that were just as cheap — and far
more accurate.

13

On which see Langlois and Robertson (1995), chapter 6.
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Although the decentralized character of the Swiss industry and its
reliance on Marshallian external economies may have been sufficient cause for
some inertia in the face of competence-destroying change (Glasmeier 1991), the
rigid cartel structure must also take a good part of the blame for the extent of
that inertia (Maurer 1985). By restricting imports and exports, and by tightly
controlling what and how much could be produced, the cartel stifled incentives
for innovation and closed off the once-porous structure from new ideas. “The
result,” as Enright notes, “is that the industry had neither the efficiency of a
vibrant decentralized structure, nor the coordination advantages of hierarchy”
(Enright 1995, p. 133). Swiss watch exports fell from a peak of 84 million units in
1974 to 51 million in 1980; in that year, Japanese exports, which had been less
than 19 million units in 1974, surged past at 68 million units (Landes 1983, pp.
388-389). At the same time, employment in the Swiss watch industry fell almost
by half, and the number of Swiss watch-making establishments declined by
more than half (Landes 1983, p. 353; Enright 1995, p. 133).
The story does not end here, however. In the early 1980s, when the
industry had hit rock bottom, a major, and perhaps even startling,
reorganization took place. By that time, the equity of the major family firms —
the “watch barons” — had declined to the point that they could not or would not
oppose change; and the banks, which had written off hundreds of millions of
francs, wanted out (Enright 1995, pp. 133-4). In 1981, the banks engaged Nicolas
Hayek, an engineer and management consultant, to find a solution to the
industry’s problems (Taylor 1993, p. 99; Zehnder 1994, p. 4). His proposal was
to consolidate and radically restructure the industry. At Hayek’s suggestion, the
banks, with the help of the confederation and cantonal governments, engineered
in 1983 the merger of ASUAG with SSIH, another major holding company that
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had been founded in the ‘thirties. The new company was called the Société
suisse de microélectronique et d’horlogerie (SMH). The banks toyed with the
idea of selling Omega, one of SMH’s major brands, to the Japanese, who had
offered a considerable sum. Hayek argued against the move, and insisted that
the reorganized firm could not only become successful but actually produce a
full range of watches competitively from a manufacturing base in Switzerland.
The banks insisted in turn that Hayek put his money where his mouth was,
which he and a consortium of backers promptly did. SMH is owned 51 per cent
by Hayek’s group, and the banks no longer have an important interest. (Taylor
1993; Zehnder 1994).
Once in charge, Hayek set about reorganizing the firm, which now
comprised a significant fraction of the Swiss industry.14

He centralized

manufacturing into a division called ETA, and marshaled existing and
developed new capabilities in microelectronics, notably in the specialized 1.5
volt integrated circuits used in watches. He also reorganized and decentralized
marketing according to brand, giving each a separate identity and “message.”
But the most visible result of the strategy was the creation of the low-end Swatch
brand, which married creative marketing with high-tech fabrication. A design
shop in Milan generates as many as 500 models a year. The 70 of these chosen
for production are turned out at the rate of one every 67 seconds, some 35,000 a
day (Taylor 1993, p. 104; Zehnder 1994, p. 8). By 1991, more than 100 million
Swatches had been sold (Enright 1995, p. 135).
The

result

of

this

reorganization

was

a

startling

turn-around,

transforming a 1983 loss of $124 million on $1.1 billion in revenues into a 1993

14

In 1991, SMH was the largest watch company in the world, controlling some third of the
Swiss watch industry by sales and a quarter of its employment (Enright 1995, p. 135).
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profit of $286 million on $2.1 billion in revenues (Taylor 1993, p. 99). In 1992,
SMH held 10 per cent of the world market (Zehnder 1994, p. 3).

Plausible personal capitalism.
What can this story teach us about entrepreneurship and rationalization? There
is certainly much of the story that has a familiar Chandlerian ring. From the first
établisseurs to mechanized production in a Marshallian industrial district,
business was a personal and family activity. Beginning with trustification and
cartelization in the 1920s, however, this began to change, and the industry set off
— perhaps too slowly — on a path of rationalization that led ultimately to a fully
articulated and vertically integrated modern corporation. As Enright puts it in
describing the emergence of SMH, “[c]oordination through much of the Swiss
watch industry had passed from markets, to cartels, to modern corporate
management” (Enright 1995, p. 137). This sequence is indeed in keeping with
the general pattern Chandler observed in large segments of American industry.
Nearly all enterprises that grew by merger followed the same path.
They had their beginnings as trade associations that managed
cartels formed by many small manufacturing enterprises.

The

federations then consolidated legally into a single enterprise,
taking the form of a trust or a holding company. Administrative
centralization followed legal consolidation. The governing board
of the merger rationalized the manufacturing facilities of the
constituent companies and administered the enlarged plants from a
single central office. The final step was to integrate forward into
marketing and backward into purchasing and the control of raw or
semifinished materials. By the time it completed the last move, the
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consolidated enterprise was employing a set of lower, middle, and
top managers to administer, monitor, coordinate, and plan for the
activities of its many operating units and for the enterprise as a
whole.

By then the visible hand of management replaced the

invisible hand of market forces in coordinating the flow from the
suppliers of raw materials to the ultimate consumer. (Chandler
1977, p. 315.)
In this account, the rise of SMH represents the final act in a familiar Chandlerian
drama.
One interpretation, then, would run along the following lines.

The

history of the Swiss watchmaking industry reflects precisely the sort of
“progressive rationalization” Schumpeter described. The early history of the
industry tells of Schumpeterian “early” capitalism, in which individual
entrepreneurs provided the impetus for growth. The Chandlerian sequence,
however, tracks an eventual transformation to Schumpeterian “later” capitalism,
in which the collective enterprise takes preeminence over the personal element.
As the reader may suspect, I consider such an interpretation not merely
wrong but close to backwards. Having taken Schumpeter back to his Weberian
roots, we are in a position to see why.
Despite their similar Weberian influences, the Schumpeterian story of the
obsolescence of the entrepreneur is not identical to the Chandlerian account of
the rise of the visible hand. In Chandler, as in Weber, the emphasis is not on the
innovative character of the large bureaucratic organization but on its ability to
deliver the goods. The managers “administer, monitor, coordinate, and plan.”
They do not carry out new combinations. For Chandler, economic growth is
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underpinned by an imperative to high-volume throughput; the personal element
in organization stands in the way of fully realizing this imperative, for which an
abstract and professional structure is required.
As we saw, however, Schumpeter’s claims are much different.
associates “personal” capitalism with charismatic leadership.

He

It is the

entrepreneur who makes dramatic, and often creatively destructive, changes. In
Schumpeter, those who come along and fill in the details are important, but it is
the changes that really matter. The obsolescence thesis is a claim not that large,
fully articulated enterprises may be necessary to realize the vision of an
individual entrepreneur; rather, it is a claim that those enterprises will be the
sources of change. Let us put it succinctly. In Chandler, large organizations are
the result of economic change; in Schumpeterian later capitalism, economic
change is the result of large organizations.
My contention is that, whereas the story of Swiss watchmaking may (with
some reservations to be noted) fit the Chandlerian pattern, it does not at all fit
the Schumpeterian one. To put it another way, the transformation of the Swiss
watch industry in the 1980s is precisely a story of charismatic individual
entrepreneurship.
The first, and most obvious, point is that it was an outside individual, not
an organization, who was responsible for the reorganization of the industry.
Lazonick is right in saying that genuine innovation involves reorganizing or
planning (which may not be the same thing) the horizontal and vertical division
of labor.15 But it was not in this case “organizational capabilities” that brought
the reorganization about. It was an individual and not at all a “collective”
vision, one that, however carefully thought out, was a cognitive leap beyond the
15

On the notion of “planning” within the firm, see Langlois (1995).
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existing paradigm.

If SMH now possesses organizational capabilities, as it

surely does, those capabilities were the result, not the cause, of the innovation.
Moreover, the formation and organization of SMH reflects many more
elements of genuinely personal capitalism than the Chandlerian account would
suggest. First of all, Hayek is the owner, not a manager. “I put my money on
the line,” says Hayek, “along with money from our investors. The fact that our
group controls a majority of the equity means we could make decisions that
other people were scared to make” (Taylor 1993, p. 110). But the enterprise is
personal in other ways as well.

Even discounting the usual rhetoric of

entrepreneurship, Hayek is clearly charismatic in the ordinary sense of the term
— the Harvard Business Review (Taylor 1993, p. 99) called him “a genuine
business celebrity” — and probably in the Weberian sense as well. Consider
Hayek’s own words.
It is extremely important to lead by example, while at the same
time provide young managers with human and emotional support.
You can only really motivate and reward someone by showing that
you really are his or her friend. You have to establish an emotional
connection. You have to show your employees that you really care
for them and that they can count on you. When somebody is in
difficulties, I don’t fire him or her, on the contrary I immediately
jump at his or her side, provide support, and push him or her to do
better. In that sense, I am a leader, one whose leadership extends
beyond the usual. (Zehnder 1994, p. 9.)
The visible hand of management here seems to be relying on “an emotional form
of communal relationship” (Weber 1947, p. 360).
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But is not SMH, however created, now a vertically integrated bureaucratic
organization along Chandlerian lines, and is that not the source of its superiority
over the Marshallian industrial district it replaced? As I have argued elsewhere
(Langlois 1992; Langlois and Robertson 1995, chapter 3), the benefit of
centralization lies in the ability to bring about change, not in the ability to
administer existing structures.16 A centralized structure may remain centralized
for reasons of path dependency or even of static transaction costs of the familiar
sort. But, very often, an imperative of decentralization soon becomes clear even
within the centralized organization once it has become well established. This is
certainly true of SMH, which has 211 profit centers.17

“Organizational

structure,” in Hayek’s view,
is the most inhuman thing ever invented.

It goes against our

nature as people. So we have clear boundaries and targets. Our
brands work independently of one another. The people at Omega
and Rado and Tissot have their own buildings. They have their
own managements. They are responsible for their own design,
marketing,

communications

and

distribution.

They

are

emotionally connected to their brands, not just to SHM as an entity.

16

Since Weber, there has developed a good deal more skepticism about the efficacy of
bureaucracy even to administer existing structures. For example, Coleman (1990)
criticizes Weber for conflating the idea of bureaucracy as an impersonal hierarchy of
positions with the idea that bureaucracy is always the most efficient structure for
allocating resources. Drawing on the modern literature of agency theory, he points out
that positions can often be used to attain personal goals rather than the functional goals
of the organization. (Remember the case of Waltham Watch Company.)

17

Moreover, even as highly integrated a structure as SMH remains imbedded in the
market. And some of the success of Swatch is arguably attributable to external
capabilities in the region, notably injection-molding (for the plastic case) and automated
assembly technology that was unique to Switzerland (Taylor 1993, p. 107). Indeed, the
Jura remains a Marshallian industrial district today, one that has diversified beyond
watchmaking into microtechnologies more generally (Maillat, et al. 1995).
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I want people at Rado to love Rado.

And I want people at

Longines to love their brand. (Taylor 1993, p. 110.)
In fact, much of the integration at SMH is what Chandler would call “defensive,”
that is, ownership integration18 aimed at controlling portions of the production
process in a world in which there are only two other producers of movements,
Seiko and Citizen (Taylor 1993, p. 109).
But does this case prove that entrepreneurship must always arise from
outside the firm, or that organizations cannot be sources of innovation? Surely no
one case can be decisive.

But this story reinforces what is arguably the

theoretical conclusion both of organizational sociology and of management
theory.
In a very insightful gloss on Weber, the late sociologist James Coleman
(1990) suggested that charisma of the sort Nicolas Hayek wields may actually be
thought of as a “rational” form of authority, one that is especially important in
times of crisis and radical change.19 In his well-known study of bureaucracy,
Michel Crozier also stresses the importance of crisis for organizational change.
For Crozier,
change in a bureaucratic organization must come from the top
down and must be universalistic, i.e., encompass the whole
organization en bloc.

Change will not come gradually on a

piecemeal basis. It will wait until a serious question pertaining to
18

As distinct from genuine coordination integration. On this terminology see Langlois
and Robertson (1995), chapters 2 and 7.

19

Similarly, Peter Temin (1980) makes a tripartite distinction — among rational,
traditional, and command behavior — that is similar to that of Weber. Temin argues
that people will behave according to different modes in different times and places. My
argument is that entrepreneurship is an instance of command behavior, which is
effective in times of radical economic change or opportunity.

R. N. Langlois

Schumpeter and Personal Capitalism

Page 33

an important dysfunction can be raised. Then it will be argued
about and decided upon at the higher level and applied to the
whole organization, even to the areas where dysfunctions are not
seriously felt.

...

Crises are important in another way.

They

exemplify other patterns of action, other types of group
relationships — temporary, but of decisive importance. During
crises, individual initiative prevails and people eventually come to
depend on some strategic individual’s arbitrary whim. (Crozier
1964, p. 196.)
In other words, bureaucracies always respond to crisis with what is in effect a
temporary departure from the following of rules and a return to an arbitrary
type of authority.20 Thus, even to the extent that (more or less) radical change
does take place within an articulated Weberian bureaucracy, it does so by
emulating

the

cognitive

and

authority

structure

of

Schumpeterian

entrepreneurship.21
We find a similar story in the management literature.

Consider, for

example, the writings of Hamel and Prahalad (1994), who are not only among
the more influential gurus of the times but also among the strongest proponents
of an organizational-capabilities view of management.

As students of

management and corporate consultants, of course, they are primarily interested
in the question of how to make firms innovative rather than the question of
whether innovation does or should take place within the bounds of firms. So
20

Such authority is “personal” in the sense that it reflects the will of an individual at the
top of the hierarchy, even if, in Crozier’s account, it is not personal in the sense of being
face-to-face or strictly charismatic in Weber’s meaning.

21

And, as Joseph Berliner (1976) points out in his study of Soviet industry, a bureaucracy
that makes individual initiative impossible makes innovation impossible.
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they are in quest of the innovative organization. And surely organizations can
be innovative at some level. Even in Nelson and Winter (1982), for example,
firms may be bound by routines, but some of those routines can be “higher
level” ones that govern the search for new lower-level routines. Nonetheless,
innovativeness requires more than mechanistically searching for new routines.
In Hamel and Prahalad, it essentially involves forcing the firm to take on more
of the characteristics of a market: it must develop the kind of genetic diversity
Friedrich Hayek praised. “In nature,” they write, “genetic variety comes from
unexpected

mutations.

The

corporate

corollary

is

skunk

works,

intrapreneurship, spinoffs, and other forms of bottom-up innovation” (Hamel
and Prahalad 1994, p. 61).
In the end, however, they, like Crozier, realize that the most radical kind
of change must come from the top down: it requires a Schumpeterian
entrepreneurial vision. “Top management cannot abdicate its responsibility for
developing, articulating, and sharing a point of view about the future. What is
needed are not just skunk works and intrapreneurs, but senior managers who
can escape the orthodoxies of the corporation’s current ‘concept of self’” (Hamel
and Prahalad 1994, p. 87). Example? Nicolas Hayek’s “crazy” vision that the
Swiss could manufacture cheap watches competitively with the Japanese (pp. 9899).
Economist, of course, must take a slightly different perspective, as they
must remain open to the possibility that change might take place not within an
already-existing organization but rather in new firms, groups of firms, or
“markets” broadly understood.22

22

And there is no reason to think that all

These various alternatives are what Langlois and Robertson (1995) refer to as business
institutions.
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innovation must come from “re-engineering” existing organizations, even if
some surely does.
Indeed, one might argue that, the farther an innovation is from the ken of
existing firms, the more likely it is that the innovation will be instantiated in new
organizations.

We can think about this in the imagery of the economics of

rugged landscapes23 (Levinthal 1992). If we think of innovative opportunities as
“peaks” in some suitably defined space, then we might expect those who inhabit
known peaks to be able perhaps to discover nearby opportunities through
relatively myopic search. But “peaks” that are far away — radical innovations
— are likely to be discovered and exploited by quite different individuals and
organizations.
Whether Schumpeterian entrepreneurship operates from the top of an
existing organization or in the creation of new ones, the same conclusion seems
unavoidable.

The charismatic authority and coherent vision of such

entrepreneurship remains an inevitable part of capitalism, however modern. For
reasons that have to do with the nature of cognition and with the structure of
knowledge in organized society, some essential part of capitalism must always
remain personal.

23

I am indebted to Massimo Egidi for this idea.
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